Apropos
Hugo Chávez's role as mediator in the Colombian conflict
By
Eduardo Dimas
Mexican
journalist Carlos Aznárez writes in Resumen
Latinoamericano that
President Hugo Chávez's decision to act as a mediator in a
humanitarian exchange between the Colombian government and the
guerrilla movement FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is a
"difficult and bold role."
The
purpose is to exchange the soldiers, politicians and policemen held
by the FARC by about 500 FARC guerrillas now held in Colombian
prisons. Aznárez calls them "dungeons" and,
according to some information, he is quite right.
Chávez
visited Colombia on Aug. 31 and met with his Colombian counterpart,
Álvaro Uribe Vélez, one of the main allies of the
United States in the region, to establish the mechanisms of
mediation. This is not at all an easy task, when we take into account
the substantial differences between the two presidents on political
and ideological issues.
Apropos
Hugo Chávez's role as mediator in the Colombian conflict
By
Eduardo Dimas
Mexican
journalist Carlos Aznárez writes in Resumen
Latinoamericano that
President Hugo Chávez's decision to act as a mediator in a
humanitarian exchange between the Colombian government and the
guerrilla movement FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is a
"difficult and bold role."
The
purpose is to exchange the soldiers, politicians and policemen held
by the FARC by about 500 FARC guerrillas now held in Colombian
prisons. Aznárez calls them "dungeons" and,
according to some information, he is quite right.
Chávez
visited Colombia on Aug. 31 and met with his Colombian counterpart,
Álvaro Uribe Vélez, one of the main allies of the
United States in the region, to establish the mechanisms of
mediation. This is not at all an easy task, when we take into account
the substantial differences between the two presidents on political
and ideological issues.
Those
differences became particularly evident during the press conference
both presidents gave after meeting for seven hours. Some of the
journalists present said that Chávez looked uncomfortable and
that he tried to explain his role in the negotiation. He announced
that he will meet with representatives of the FARC and then added the
ELN (National Liberation Army). Needless to say, the meetings will be
held separately.
Of
course, the Colombian government and the ELN held talks in Cuba for
several months, without reaching an agreement, not even on peace
negotiations.
Among
other things, the representatives of the Colombian government
demanded that the ELN provide the names of its principal leaders, as
well as the number of weapons and guerrillas it has. It was something
like getting intelligence information without giving anything in
exchange.
At the
press conference, Chávez said that "an analysis shows me
that the swift response of the FARC is positive. We shall talk with
whomever they choose." And he added something that didn't please
President Uribe at all: "I hope that someone is [FARC chief]
Manuel Marulanda. I would very much like to meet him and talk to
him."
Visibly angered, Uribe began to talk about "the FARC terrorists and murderers."
According
to some alternative media, Uribe lied when he said that FARC
guerrillas killed the 11 legislators they held captive, when it is
well known that they died in the crossfire during a raid by
paramilitary soldiers who tried to rescue them and collect a reward.
Then,
Uribe annouced that under no conditions would he grant the FARC the
character of "belligerent force" -- something the
guerrillas demanded -- and that he will not clear any region of
Colombia for the exchange of prisoners.
Some of
the journalists present reported that Chávez appeared
uncomfortable while listening to the Colombian president, because
Uribe's stance left him little room to maneuver. Perhaps that's the
objective.
Chávez
insisted that the talks be held in Caracas, between his government
and the FARC, which constitutes a de-facto
recognition of that
guerrilla movement. And, although he did not say so directly, he
intimated that without the participation of the FARC there is no
possible exchange of prisoners and peace will not come to Colombia.
Many
questions can be posed after this meeting. It is evident that Chávez
does not agree with Uribe and the U.S. government that the FARC and
the ELN are terrorist organizations. The mere mention of his desire
to meet Manuel Marulanda is eloquent.
In
addition, it is more than obvious that the differences in posture
between the two governments are practically incompatible. Therefore,
the task of mediating between the Colombian guerrillas and the
Colombian government becomes almost impossible.
So far,
the Colombian government's position has been to seek amnesty for the
paramilitary groups, whose links to the highest echelons of the army
and to well-known politicians have been amply demonstrated.
Even
President Uribe himself apparently had relations with the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) when he was governor of
Antioquia province. His name, still not published, appears on a long
list compiled by the U.S. Department of State.
The AUC
(paramilitaries) have tortured, murdered and "disappeared"
tens of thousands of Colombians and provoked the displacement of
hundreds of thousands of peasants. The AUC's links to drug
trafficking also are well known.
I find
it noteworthy that Senator Susana Palacios, a renowned critic of the
Colombian president, accepted being part of the mediation team with
the FARC and later invited Chávez to act as the mediator.
I do not
rule out that the senator fell into a trap and, in turn, led the the
Venezuelan president to it. Regardless of whether that is true,
Chávez is a man with ample political resources and much
prestige among Latin American peoples.
It is
precisely one of the constant tasks of the Venezuelan, Spanish, U.S.
and other media to disparage the image of the president who has won
the largest number of truly democratic elections and has taken the
most steps to benefit his people in the past 40 years of Latin
America's history.
A few
weeks ago, the Peruvian daily Expreso
raised a ruckus about some
cans of tuna, allegedly sent by the Venezuelan government after the
Aug. 15 earthquake, with labels showing images of Chávez and
Peruvian opposition leader Ollanta Umala. It was a clumsy attempt to
show that Chávez and Umala took advantage of the tragedy to
make political propaganda.
Some
Peruvian, Spanish, U.S. and other newspapers immediately seized on
the allegation. They all quoted the daily Expreso.
No other source reported seeing the tuna cans. It was a clumsy set-up
and it died a natural death. But in Spain and the U.S. many people
probably read the news and believed it to be true.
We
cannot rule out that they are again trying to discredit Chávez.
They may be trying to demonstrates that he has links to the Colombian
guerrillas, something that has always been alleged in the campaigns
against Chávez. It that is the objective -- I do not involve
Senator Palacios in this -- it is also a clumsy move that could
backfire against its perpetrators.
As journalist Carlos Aznárez writes, "when a member of the secretariat of the FARC shakes Hugo Chávez's hand and tells anyone who wishes to listen that the FARC fight for Colombia's national and social liberation and to topple unfair economic structures," it will be the first time that the FARC will have the opportunity in recent years to publicly express the motives of its struggle.
It may happen that Chávez's mediation gets no publicity in the media of the U.S. and its allies worldwide. This is very probable and, if it occurs, the media's silence will be proof that the trap did not work. Time will tell.
